Lectures

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  1. Games and Strategies

  In our introductory lecture, Dr. Bonevac traces the origins of game theory through the work of John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, and John Forbes Nash Jr. He then explores its applications in economics, politics, philosophy, and everyday life, showing how it helps us better understand strategic choices. The lecture introduces strategic thinking, rational decision-making, preferences, utility functions, pure and mixed strategies, and the distinctions between simultaneous and sequential, zero-sum and mutually beneficial, and cooperative and competitive games. We conclude with Pascal's Wager as an illustration of dominant strategy and preview the tension between individual and collective rationality explored in later lectures.
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  2. Coordination and Convention

  In lecture two, we explore coordination games and social conventions as solutions to coordination problems, using Nash equilibria to explain how players align their strategies for mutual benefit. Through examples such as the driving game, the Battle of the Sexes, and the tragedy of the commons, we examine how individuals and groups reach stable outcomes despite competing preferences. Dr. Bonevac also introduces social capital—trust, norms, and networks—and concludes by showing how simple, enforceable conventions, as described by David Hume and David Lewis, enable coordination at scale and lay the groundwork for later discussions of trust and cooperation.
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  3. Cooperation Games

  In lecture three, we study cooperation games and the prisoner’s dilemma, beginning with Hobbes’ state of nature and examining how individually rational choices can produce collectively suboptimal outcomes. Through examples including arms races, environmental pollution, trade protectionism, and the tragedy of the commons, we investigate the tension between individual incentives and group welfare. Dr. Bonevac presents the stag hunt as a model of cooperation, highlighting the importance of trust and social capital. Finally, we reflect on game theory's limitations as both a descriptive and prescriptive framework, ultimately framing it as a tool for identifying the traps inherent in collective decision-making.
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  4. Competitive Games

  In lecture four, we learn about competitive games and the strategic considerations that arise when players have opposing or partially overlapping interests. Through examples such as rock-paper-scissors, the ultimatum game, workplace dynamics, and political elections, we examine how Nash equilibria, dominant strategies, and Pareto efficiency shape outcomes. Dr. Bonevac applies these concepts to economic exchange, cultural change, and strategic positioning, highlighting how rational self-interest can sometimes produce suboptimal collective results. We conclude by examining Hotelling’s Law and the median voter theorem, exploring why expected convergence toward the center can break down during periods of societal division.
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  5. Mixed Strategies

  In lecture five, we delve into mixed strategies in game theory, where players use probabilities to keep opponents uncertain in competitive settings such as sports, warfare, and workplace dynamics. We introduce the indifference principle—which keeps opponents uncertain by making all options equally attractive—as the basis for calculating mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Using examples including Hannibal’s attack on Rome, rock-paper-scissors, and the battle of the sexes, we compute mixed strategies and examine their applications. Dr. Bonevac points out that while mixed strategies are essential in competitive games, coordination and communication often produce better outcomes when cooperation is possible.
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  6. Repeated Games

  In lecture six, Dr. Bonevac explains how repeated games fundamentally change strategic behavior compared to one-time interactions, revealing why cooperation and "niceness" become essential virtues in game theory. We compare strategies such as tit for tat, Pavlov, the devil, and the bully, finding that tit for tat is especially effective because it fosters cooperation over time despite never winning individual encounters. The lecture concludes by identifying the hallmarks of successful repeated-game strategies—being nice, clear, retaliatory yet forgiving, and non-envious. Finally, we see how expanding the "footprint of the future" through sustained, multi-dimensional relationships is the most powerful way to build trust and social capital.
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  7. Sequential Games

  In lecture seven, we explore sequential games, where players make decisions with knowledge of prior actions, and examine how game trees and backward induction identify optimal strategies. The concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is introduced as a refinement of Nash equilibrium, filtering out strategies based on non-credible threats by identifying only those equilibria reachable through rational decision-making at every stage of the game. Dr. Bonevac concludes by examining real-world applications—including market entry, the ultimatum game, and cooperative farming—highlighting how human behavior often deviates from purely rational predictions due to social norms, trust, and consideration of long-term consequences.
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  8. Social Choice Theory

  In our eighth and final lecture, Dr. Bonevac presents social choice theory through Arrow's impossibility theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, demonstrating that no voting system can perfectly translate individual preferences into collective decisions without sacrificing fairness or inviting strategic manipulation. We also examine the Condorcet paradox and the logic behind Arrow's proof before comparing voting methods such as plurality, ranked choice, Borda count, and approval voting. The lecture concludes by showing why no perfect voting system exists and what that reveals about the limits of collective decision-making.