In our introductory lecture, Dr. Charles Calomiris delves into the history of financial crises, examining their causes, commonalities, and the puzzling persistence of risk-taking behaviors that contribute to their occurrence. He argues that crisis risk may be an adaptive feature of political and economic systems, despite the economic costs, as it is often tied to other desirable outcomes. Finally, the lecture introduces a taxonomic approach to studying crises through historical examples, beginning with the Roman banking crisis of 33 AD.

In lecture two, we learn about John Law's financial innovations in Scotland and France, focusing on his land bank proposal and the Mississippi bubble, while comparing it to England's South Sea bubble. The lecture examines how sovereign funding needs and war between Britain and France shaped their distinct financial systems, particularly highlighting the contrasting development of banking in Scotland versus England and Wales. The discussion concludes by analyzing how political equilibrium and sovereign interests fundamentally determine financial system development and stability.

In lecture three, we analyze the striking differences between the banking systems of the United States and Canada over the past 200 years, with the US experiencing 17 major banking crises compared to none in Canada. Dr. Calomiris explores the role of unit banking, real estate risk tolerance, and political factors in shaping these divergent outcomes, emphasizing the importance of understanding the historical and constitutional contexts that allowed these differences to endure.